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Summary findings
The  debt  burdeni facing  a nuinber  of low-income  estimated  under  this framework,  and this could  be easily
countries  has received  conisiderable  international  estimated  for  other  countries,  thus  providing  a good
attention.  The  international  developmeint  conmmu1nnity  has  starting  point  for examining  debt  sustainability.
begun  to recognize  that  options  aimiied at providing  debt  There  are three  lessons  from  the empirical  analysis  of
relief  to countries  where debt  is n(ot sustainable  need  to  Ethiopia.
he seriously  explored.  When  is debt  not  sustainable'  *  First,  a strong  reform  program  is critical  in bringing
Should  external  debt  problems  be separated  from  those  the  country  hack on a sustainable  debt  path.
related  to domestic  debt  problems?  How  does  one  *  Second,  the  issue of debt  relief  requires  serious
examine  debt  sustainability  in the broader  context  of  consideration  by the  international  development
macroeconomiiic  management?  comnimunity.
Ghani  and  Zang  build  on the  Branson  model  of debt  *  Third,  growth  and  resource  mobilization  need
sustainability  and  apply  it to a severely  indebted,  low-  adequate  emphasis  to ensure  that  debt  is repaid.
income  country  - Ethiopia.  They  provide  a simplified  For  most  severely  indebted  low-income  countries  in
framework  where  debt  sustainability  (both  domestic  and  Africa,  this would  require  renewed  emphasis  in making
cxternal)  is an  integral  element  of  macroecollonolic  agriculmtre  a dynamilic sector  of the  economy  and
stability.  Interactions  between  different  policy  variables  huilding  forward  and  backward  links  between  agriculmtre
(such  as debt,  fiscal, and  interest  rate  policies),  outcome  and the  rural  economy.  In  countries  where  famines  are
variables  (such  as GDP and  export  growth),  and  recurrent,  dynamic  agricultural  growth  is essential  not
international  economic  conditions  (international  interest  only  for debt  sustainability  but  also  for achieving  food
rates)  jointly  define  whetiler  a country  is on  a sustainable  security.
debt  path.  Equations  on debt  sustainability  can  be
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1IIntroduction  and Summary
1.  The problem of  debt burden facing a number of low-income countries has received
considerable  international  attention  in recent times. The international  development  community
has begun  to recognize  that options would  need to be seriously  explored  aimed at providing  debt
relief to those countries  where debt is not sustainable.  When is debt not sustainable?  Should
external debt problems  be separated  from those related  to domestic debt problems? How does
one examine debt sustainability  in the broader context of macroeconomic  management.  These
2 important issues have been addressed in the literature on debt sustainability. Among them,
Branson (1990) presented  a simple framework  in which debt sustainability  (both domestic and
external)  is an integral  element  of macroeconomic  stability.  In this framework,  debt sustainability
(both domestic and external) is an integral element of macroeconomic  stability. Interactions
between  different  policy variables  (such as debt, fiscal and exchange  rate policies),  and outcome
variables (such as  GDP and export growth), as well as  international economic conditions
(international  interest rates)  jointly define  if the country  is on a sustainable  debt path. This paper
applies  such a framework  in the context of Ethiopia.
2.  Ethiopia is a severely  indebted  low-income  country  (SILIC). 3 When it came to power in
May  1991, the  Transitional Government of  Ethiopia inherited a  large  debt  overhang,
compounded by a fragile macroeconomic  environment.  In 1993, the Government launched a
reform  and recovery  program, supported  by IDA, IMF, and other donors, aimed  at establishing  a
stable macroeconomic  environment,  putting  the country  on a sustainable  debt path, and resuming
growth. Being largely an agricultural economy, characterized by  low yields, Ethiopia has
frequently  been affected  by exogenous  shocks  such as droughts  and famines,  which have played
a critical role in determining  growth  and inflation. The macroeconomic  framework  described  in
this paper provides  analyses  on how the debt path of Ethiopia  could be affected  by droughts  and
famines  and what policies  would  be required  to bring  the economy  on a sustainable  path. Relying
on narrow macro policy instruments alone will not be sufficient. This would need to  be
complemented  with sustained  efforts  to accelerate  growth,  with increased  attention  towards rural
development  and policies  aimed at improving  productivity  and food security.
3.  The rest of this paper  is organized  as follows.  The first part presents  a brief overview  of the
extent  and scope  of the debt  problem  facing  Ethiopia.  The second  part provides  the macroeconomic
framework  for examining  Ethiopia's  debt dynamics.  The third part presents  empirical  findings  on
the sustainability  of Ethiopia's  debt  path.  Next,  projections  are presented  on the sustainability  of the
future  debt  path  under  different  scenarios,  followed  by conclusions.
2  For example,  Branson  (1990),  Anand  and van Wijnbergen  (1989),  Cohen  (1988),  Fischer  and Easterly  (1990),
and World  Bank  (1992).
3  See World  Debt Tables 1994-95,  Volume 1, chapter  3.
24.  Evidence shows that Ethiopia was clearly on an unsustainable debt path prior to the launch
of its reform program. In 1993, with the start of its reform program, Ethiopia has begun to make the
transition from the unsustainable to a sustainable debt path. However, this transition is not solidly
sustainable in the face of shocks, as the problem of debt overhang continues to be severe. Ensuring
the sustainability of Ethiopia's debt would require actions on two fronts: debt stock reduction and
prudent macro management. First, relief on Paris Club debt on Naples Terms High, would help to
reduce  the  debt  overhang. This  would  need to  be  complemented with  retiring  outstanding
commercial debt in arrears on a substantial discount. Similar debt relief would be needed from non-
Paris Club group of countries. Second, Ethiopia would also need to take more aggressive actions on
the policy reform front.
5.  The need for further strengthening the policy environment is reinforced by the different
projections presented on how Ethiopia could maintain the sustainability of its future debt path, in
the event that the country suffers from a severe drought, and under other scenarios. A key finding
here is that in the absence of a substantial fiscal effort, Ethiopia would slide back towards an
unsustainable debt path. Under the worst case scenario, if the country is affected by a major drought
which results in zero real GDP growth, and if the policy makers wish to restrain inflation to less
than 5 percent per annum, then they would need to generate a sur1  on primary fiscal balance to
prevent the debt path from becoming unsustainable.
The Extent of Ethiopia's  Debt Problem
6.  The extent of debt problem facing Ethiopia is presented in Table 1. Selected ratios on debt
service burdens for Ethiopia are compared with the average for all  SILICs, comprising of 32
countries, as well as with individual East African countries. The table  shows that the ratio on
scheduled debt service to exports of goods and services at 47.4 percent for Ethiopia was slightly
greater in comparison to  the average of 43.0 percent for all SILICs. Ethiopia's scheduled debt
service to  exports ratio was  substantially greater than its  actual debt service to  exports  ratio,
highlighting that Ethiopia has accumulated arrears on its external debt. In  1993, the actual debt
service to exports ratio for Ethiopia was just 9 percent in comparison to 18 percent for all SILICs.
This is one indicator of debt overhang, resulting from arrears accumulation, and it is substantially
more significant in Ethiopia in comparison to other SILICs (see World Debt Tables,  1994-95,
Volume 1, Chapter 3). At end- 1994, Ethiopia's ratio of the present value of debt service obligations
on its existing debt stock to exports of goods and services was about 370 percent. 4
4  The ratio is computed  by taking  the ratio  of the present  value  of debt service  on its existing  debt stock as of
end-  1994  (discounted  at a rate  of 8 percent)  to average  exports  for  the past  three  years  (1992-94).
3Table 1: Ethiopia's Debt Service  Burdens, 1993  (percent)
County  Scheduled  debt  Actual  debt  service  to  Scheduled  debt  service  to  resource  transfers
service to exports  exports  exports plus grants  to GDP
SILICs  43.0  18.2  36.8  4.9
Ethiopia  47.4  9.0  23.3  24.7
Kenya  29.7  28.0  25.5  2.5
Tanzania  78.8  25.1  36.8  29.4
Uganda  81.1  60.6  34.3  8.6
Source:  World  Debt Tables,  1994-95,  Volume 1,  Chapter  3; 1991-93  average  for exports  and grants.
Structure  of External  Debt
7.  Ethiopia's  total  long-term  extemal  debt  stock  was  US  $4.3  billion  as  of  May  30,  1995
(excluding US$ 72 million owed to IMF, and US$ 28 million of short-term debt),
Table 2. Ethiopia -External Long-Term Debt Stock by Term and Type of Creditor
Before  expected  debt  relief  (end  May 95)  After  expected  debt relief
Type  of Debtor  Millions  US$ % of total LDOD  Millions  US$  % of total LDOD
Long-Term  Debt (LDOD)*  4,299  100.0  3,188  100.0
Public  and publicly  guaranteed  4,299  100.0  3,188  100.0
Private  non-guaranteed  0  0.0  0  0.0
Public  and Publicly  Guaranteed  4,299  100.0  3,188  100.0
Official  Creditors  3,593  83.6  2,889  90.6
Multilateral  2,285  53.2  2,285  71.7
Concessional  2,051  47.7  2,051  64.3
IDA  1,398  32.5  1,398  43.9
Non-Concessional  234  5.4  234  7.3
IBRD  0  0.0  0  0.0
Bilateral  1,308  30.4  604  18.9
Paris  Club  701  16.3  234  7.3
Non-Paris  Club  607  14.1  370  11.6
Bilateral  Commercial  237  5.5  0  0.0
Commercial  706  16.4  299  9.4
Bonds  0  0.0  0  0.0
Commercial  banks  299  7.0  299  9.4
Export  Credit  0  0.0  0  0.0
Suppliers  Credit  407  9.5  0  0.0
Private  Non-Guaranteed  0  0.0  0  0.0
LONG-TERM  DEBT  (LDOD)  4.299  100.0  3.188  100.0
Source:  Ministry  of Finance,  Ethiopia
Note: Debt  relief includes  the possible  Paris  Club debt relief  based  on Naples  Terms  High (67%  debt stock  reduction)
and the Commercial  Debt Buyback  on suppliers  credit  and other  bilateral  commercial  debts.
*  Outstanding  and disbursed;  does not include  Rouble  denominated  loans  (3.3 billion  Roubles),  and interest  arrears.
which was equivalent to  about 90 percent of FY95 GDP. This does not  include 3.3 billion of
Rouble debt owed to Russia; the Ethiopian and Russian authorities are currently negotiating the
4exchange rate to  be  applied to this  debt. About US$  2.3 billion of the total  debt is owed to
multilateral creditors, of which US$ 1.4 billion is owed to IDA. About US$ 1.3 billion is owed to
official bilateral creditors. Within the official bilateral creditor group, around US$ 701 million is
owed to the Paris Club and US$ 607 million is owed to non-Paris Club creditors. Within the non-
Paris Club group, bilateral debt of a commercial nature amounts to US$  237 million. Straight
commercial debt amounts to US$ 706 million, or 16 percent of the total long-term debt stock.
Within this  group, commercial banks are owed US$ 299 million. These are mainly related to
borrowings by Ethiopian Airlines. Most of this debt is collateralized and Ethiopian Airlines is
current with its payments to the commercial banks. Suppliers credits, that have been in arrears
for sometime, amount to US$ 407 million, or nearly 10 percent of the total long term debt stock.
Government's Debt Strategy
8.  The source of the present external debt problem can be traced to policies followed under
the  previous  regime,  which  included  large  borrowings  for  defense  purposes,  inappropriate
macroeconomic  policies,  and  the  channeling of  resources to  inefficient  public  undertakings
which  had  very  low  rates of  return.  Export  performance suffered  considerably  under  these
restrictive policies.  Furthermore, the  selection of projects without proper  appraisal,  delays in
project implementation and the lack of proper follow-up, had adverse effects on the optimal use
of external resources. Thus, many projects were not able to pay back their costs.
9.  Ethiopia  has prepared and adopted a  comprehensive debt management  strategy, many
aspects of which are already being implemented. Debt relief of close to US$  400 million was
obtained as a result of negotiations with the Paris Club in December 1992, mostly resulting from
rescheduling rather than stock reduction. Also, with financial assistance from Norway, Ethiopia's
debt to the IBRD was eliminated through prepayment. The Government has emphasized that its
debt  strategy  is an  integral part of  its macroeconomic management  strategy  and has  strictly
limited the scope for public external borrowing on non-concessional terms.
10.  The projections presented in Table 3 show that Ethiopia's external debt indicators would
improve significantly if, as planned, commercial debt in arrears is retired at a substantial discount
and favorable debt relief is obtained  from the Paris Club and non-Paris Club creditors. These
measures are expected to  reduce the ratio of the total  debt stock to GDP,  which is currently
around 90 percent, to 65 percent. Assuming improved debt management and an enabling policy
environment, the debt stock to GDP ratio would fall further to 50 percent by year 2000, and to 40
percent by  year 2010. After  debt relief, multilateral  creditors will account  for more than  70
percent of the reduced stock of the long-term debt. IDA will account for 44 percent of the total
debt stock. The projections  reported in Table 3 show that the total  debt service as a  ratio of
exports of goods and services will fall from 46 percent in 1994 (before debt relief) to 15 percent
in 1995 (after debt relief).  It is projected to fall to 5 percent by year 2010. IDA debt service as a
5ratio of exports  of goods and  services will average around 2 to 3 percent and  is projected to
remain at this level through the year 2010.
Table 3: Ethiopia  - Debt  Relief  Projections
(US$ million at current prices)
Est.  Proj.  r:  Pr.  Pr:  Proj.  Pr:  Proj.
1994  1915  19J6  1917  20d0  20 3 2057  2010
Total debt service, before debt  relief*  365.0  336.0  350.0  341.0  360.0  259.0  244.0  292.0
olw debt service to IDA  20.0  24.8  27.1  29.0  40.8  51.4  65.3  78.8
Debt service reduction  due to debt  relief**  0.0  169.2  176.4  165.6  148.5  108.0  108.0  120.0
Totaldebtserviceafterdebtrelief  365.0  166.8  173.6  175.4  211.5  151.0  136.0  172.0
Before debt  relief
Debt  service/Exports  of goods  &  services  46  30  29  26  24  14  10  9
Debt stock/GDP  (%)  93  89  82  78  65  56  5  1  47
After debt relief
Debt  service/Exports  of  goods  &  services  46  15  14  14  14  8  5  5
Debt stock/GDP  (%)  93  65  60  59  50  45  43  40
IDA debt service/Exports  of G & S (%)  3  2  2  2  3  3  3  3
Note: For these projections, annual average growth rates of real GDP and real exports are 5.5 percent and 5.7 percent
respectively, for the period 1996-2010; Rouble-denominated loans amounting to 3.3 billion Roubles are not included.
*  Assumes new commitments from IDA and other multilateral and official bilateral sources remain constant in real terms.
*  Assumes successful completion of  Commercial Debt Buyback operation, parallel operation to retire bilateral commercial
debt, and Paris Club  relief on Naples Terms High.
The Macroeconomic Framework
11.  The basic framework for the macro analysis is the standard model of external and internal
balance that assigns fiscal policy to internal balance and monetary policy to external balance. 5
The internal objective in the original Mundell analysis was the level of output or unemployment.
Here, the objective is an acceptably low rate of inflation.  Mundell took the balance of payments
--a flow variable-- as the external objective; here, it is defined as an acceptable level of foreign
exchange  reserves,  a  stock  variable.  At  the  aggregate  level,  the  government  controls  two
instruments:  the level of the budget deficit (or surplus) and the mix of financing the deficit
between borrowing from the public (domestic debt), including abroad (external debt), and money
A  detailed  application  is presented by  Professor  Branson  in Trade Policy  Reforms  Under  Adjustment
Pgrama,  Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, March 1992. This model goes back to  Salter
(1959) and Swan (1968).  The specific assignment comes from Mundell (1962).
6issue.6 The Mundell assignment sets the budget deficit to control aggregate demand to achieve
the inflation  objective, then sets the  financing mix to maintain  the reserve level,  adjusts  the
budget setting  to allow for feedback from  the financing mix onto inflation, and  iterates to a
solution where  both  objectives are approximately met. In this  framework, debt sustainability
(both  domestic  and  external) is an  integral element of  macroeconomic stability.  Interactions
between different policy variables (such as debt, fiscal and interest rate policies), and outcome
variables  (such  as  GDP  and  export  growth),  as  well  as  international  economic  conditions
(international interest rates) jointly define if the country is on a sustainable debt path.
12.  In the application of this framework for Ethiopia, we assume that an unacceptably high
rate of inflation indicates the need for reduction in the primary kor non-interest) budget deficit, or
increase  in the  surplus.  This can  be interpreted as reducing inflation by reducing  aggregate
demand, or it can be interpreted as reducing the need for inflation tax financing of the deficit.
Thus,  the  internal  balance  application  is  straightforward--a  reduction  in  primary  deficit  is
necessary for inflation reduction.
13.  The  application  for  external  balance  is  somewhat  more  complex. 7 A  "flexible"  or
"realistic"  exchange  rate  policy  requires  moving  the  nominal  exchange  rate  to  prevent
appreciation of the currency in real terms, or generate some gradual real depreciation. Given that
there is always some degree of international capital mobility, if the real interest rates get too far
below international rates, there will be a capital outflow and loss of reserves.  This implies that
maintenance  of  external balance requires keeping  real interest  rates  high  enough  relative  to
international  rates  that  the  relevant  investors  are  willing  to  keep  their  deposits  and  other
investments in the country.  Thus, monetary policy must manage the mix of financing the deficit
such that
(1)  r>r  +de+rp,
where  r  is the  domestic  real interest  rate,  r* is  the international real  interest  rate,  de  is the
expected rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate, e, and rp is a risk premium that embodies
both the market's estimate of the risk in holding local-currency assets and the degree of capital
mobility.  In countries with open capital markets, the risk premium is positive, and  domestic
rates are tied closely to international rates.  On the other hand, a country with  air-tight capital
controls  could effectively  maintain a  negative risk  premium,  and  determine  its  interest  rate
independently of international market conditions.
6  See 1. A. Frenkel and A. Razin, Fiscal Policies and the World Economy (MIT Press, 1987), for a complete
analysis of the effects of the composition of government spending and taxation.
The key  drawback of this  framework is that it assumes that capital is internationally mobile. Also, this
framework does not address the problem that not all output growth can be converted into foreign exchange
earnings.
7Fiscal and Debt Dynamics
14.  The  above  approach  to  the  analysis  of  external  and  internal  balance  can  also  be
interpreted in terms of the analysis of debt sustainability. 8 This paper adopts the approach taken
by Branson  (1990),  which  develops the government's  budget constraint  in  real  terms  into a
formula for the growth of the ratio of total debt to GDP:
(2)  db=(r-n)*b+p-s,
where b is the ratio of debt to GDP, db is its arithmetic (not percentage) annual growth, r is the
real interest rate,  n is the growth rate of real GDP, p is the primary deficit after grants  as a
fraction of GDP, and s is the ratio of seigniorage to GDP.  Seigniorage here includes both the
"inflation tax" and real growth in demand for base money as the economy grows.9
15.  The analysis of external and internal balance using the debt dynamics equation  could
proceed as follows.  Seigniorage (s) would be determined from the projected growth rate and
inflation objective, combined with an estimate of the velocity of base money.  The real interest
rate would come from the arbitrage equation (1), given the outstanding stock of debt.  In general,
the Government knows approximately the level of the rate that is needed to prevent excessive
capital outflow, or capital controls may eliminate the problem.  Equation (2) would then yield the
value of the primary deficit (p) that is consistent with internal balance.
16.  In some cases,  estimates of the velocity of base money and its  sensitivity to changing
interest  rates or  inflation  expectations, or  of the  relation between  increasing  debt  issue  and
interest  rates,  may  be  unavailable  or  unreliable.  In  these  cases,  policy  must  proceed
incrementally. The directions for policy change indicated by the modern debt dynamics approach
are the same as those indicated by the classic internal-external balance approach. If inflation is
unacceptably high,  reduce the primary  deficit.  If foreign exchange reserves  are too  low, or
falling too fast, tighten monetary policy, that is, shift from money finance toward debt finance of
the existing deficit.
Ethiopia's Debt Dynamics
17.  The  debt  dynamics  for  Ethiopia  can  be  analyzed more  precisely  by  looking  at  the
components of the equation giving the change in the ratio of debt to GDP, equation (2) above,
repeated here for reference:
See,  for example,  R. Anand  and S. van Wijnbergen,  "Inflation  and the Financing  of Government  Expenditure:
An Introductory  Analysis  with an Application  to Turkey,"  World  Bank Economic  Review  3, January 1989,
pp. 17-38.
The seigniorage  term in the debt dynamics  equation  (2) is s = (dp  + n)/v,  where  dp is the inflation  rate,  n is the
real GDP  growth  rate, and  v is the velocity  of base  money.
8(2)  db = (r - n)*b + p - s.
where b is debt ratio, and db is its annual arithmetic change, r is the real interest rate, n is real
GDP  growth  rate,  p  is primary  fiscal balance  as  a  fraction  of  GDP,  and  s is  the  ratio  of
seigniorage to GDP. It is known that b is positive as Ethiopia is a debtor country.  Thus the sign
of the growth term (r - n) will tell whether the debt process is itself unstable:  if (r - n) is positive,
the debt ratio will tend to be growing by feeding on itself.  The country is borrowing to service
its debt.  In this case, for the overall process to be stable, the primary deficit less seigniorage term
(p - s) would have to be negative; the primary deficit would have to be less than the amount that
can be financed by seigniorage. For the debt path to be sustainable, db would need to be non-
positive.
18.  Table 4 presents data on the relevant variables. For the sake of simplicity, average figures
are  compared  for  the  pre-reform  period,  FY90-FY92,  and  the  reform  period,  FY93-FY95.
Projections  are  also provided  for FY96.  The  average annual  ratio  on external  debt to  GDP
increased from 44 percent during the period FY90-92 to 97 percent per annum during the period
FY93-95.  Total debt (including  domestic and  external debt) to  GDP ratio  increased  from  75
percent to  126 percent per  annum during the  same period. Debt  ratios increased  during  this
period as Ethiopia borrowed, largely on concessional terms, to finance its reform and recovery
program; part of the increase is also explained by the devaluation of the domestic currency. The
average real GDP growth rate increased from a negative 2.2 percent per annum during FY90-92
to 6.4 percent during FY93-95.
19.  Calculation of the real interest rate (r) for inclusion in the growth factor (r - n) is more
problematic than the growth rate (n).  Ethiopia had controlled financial markets and maintained
negative real  interest  rates,  measured  in  domestic  currency, prior  to  reform,  although  these
controls were not effective.  With the implementation of the program, Ethiopia has liberalized its
financial markets and raised real rates.  In Table 4, LIBOR 6-month interest rate is reported. Real
interest rate is estimated using the forward inflation rate for industrialized countries. There are
two arguments for using international real interest rates in the growth factor (r - n), instead of
domestic rates.  First, a large proportion of Ethiopia's debt are external debt.  Thus, the use of
international interest  rates would  be  more appropriate.  Second, the  opportunity  cost  to  the
economy of internal funds is the international real interest rate they could earn abroad. Finally,
data on domestic interest rates are not reliable. These arguments lead us to base the estimates of
the relevant real interest rate on the international rate.
20.  The change in the primary fiscal deficit (p) is also shown in Table 4. Ethiopia has made a
substantial  effort to  reduce its primary fiscal deficit. As a ratio of GDP, primary  deficit was
reduced from 8.5 percent per annum during FY90-92 to 5.4 percent during FY93-95, amounting
to a reduction in primary deficit by 3.1 percentage points of GDP. Nevertheless, primary deficit
9continues to be high in comparison to most other reforming countries. The last ingredient is the
calculation of seigniorage revenue (s). Table 4 shows that seigniorage revenue amounted to 4.2
percent of GDP per annum during the period FY90-92, and it fell marginally to 4.0 percent of
GDP during the period FY93-95.
Table 4: Macro indicators,  FY1990-95
FY1990  FY1991  FY1992  FY1993  FY1994  FY1995  FY90-92  FY93-95
actual  actual  actual  actual  estimated estimated  average  average
External debt, million USS  3780.3  4169.2  4360.1  4728.6  4883.5  5025.7  4103.2  4879.3
External debt, million Birr  7825.2  8630.2  9025.4  22044.7  29056.8  31963.5  8493.6  27688.3
Domestic debt, million Biff  5027.0  6046.0  7033.6  7780.9  8268.9  8204.0  6035.5  8084.6
Total debt, million Birr  12852.2  14676.2  16059.0  29825.6  37325.7  40167.5  14529.2  35772.9
GDP at current mp, million Biff  17871.7  19815.5  20379.8  26034.7  27596.1  31764.5  19355.7  28465.1
Money, million Birr  4982.6  6123.3  6840.1  7683.5  8373.1  9428.4  5982.0  8495.0
Extemal debt to GDP ratio (%/6)  44  44  44  85  105  101  44  97
Total debt to GDP ratio (%)  72  74  79  115  135  126  75  126
Velocity of money  3.59  3.24  2.98  3.39  3.30  3.37  3.24  3.35
Inflation rate (%)  5.2  20.9  21.0  10.0  1.2  10.4  15.7  7.2
Growth rate of real GDP (%/)  3.4  -6.7  -3.2  12.3  1.3  5.5  -2.2  6.4
Seigniorage  to GDP ratio (%)  2.4  4.4  6.0  6.6  0.8  4.7  4.2  4.0
Nominal interest rate, LIBOR  6-month  8.8%  7.3%  4.90/o  3.5%  3.6%  4.8%  7.0%  4.0%
MUV, %change  5.7%  2.1%  4.3%  -2.3%  3.0%  1.5%  4.0%  0.7%
Real interest rate, LIBOR 6-month  3.1%  5.2%  0.6%  5.8%  0.6%  3.3%  3.0%  3.2%
Primary deficit to GDP ratio (°/e)  11.9  7.6  5.9  5.2  7.0  4.1  8.5  5.4
21.  The estimates of the growth factor (r - n) and the primary deficit less seigniorage (p - s)
for the pre-reform  period, FY90-92,  and the ongoing reform period, FY93-95,  are shown  in
Table  5. Data on  real  interest  rate (r),  the growth  rate (n), the  primary  deficit (p),  and  the
seigniorage rate (s), are all annual averages for pre-reform and the reform period. Recall that in
the debt dynamics equation (2), the growth factor multiplies the ratio of total debt to GDP  [(r-
n)*b].  This product plus (p - s) gives the change in the debt ratio (db).
22.  The last column in Table 5 provides estimates on the arithmetic change in debt ratio, db =
(r -n)*b + (p - s). It shows that Ethiopia was on an unsustainable debt path prior to the launch of
the reform program -- db grew by an annual average of 8.5 percentage points of GDP during the
period  FY90-92.  With  the  launch  of  the  reform  program  in  FY93,  the  debt  path  became
sustainable with the total  debt to GDP ratio contracting by 2.5 percentage points  of GDP per
annum during the reform period.
10Debt, Drought, and Budget Scenarios
23.  The rest of this paper presents illustrative scenarios for the base case, low case, and in the
case of a severe drought. It is assumed here that the Government's objective is to prevent its debt
from becoming unsustainable while maintaining internal and external balance. Here, as before,
we  consider  the  low  inflation  rate  as  the  target  for  internal  balance  and  adequate  foreign
exchange  reserves  for  external  balance.  To  maintain  internal  and  external  balance,  the
government  can  use  fiscal  instrument,  primary  fiscal  deficit,  and  monetary  instrument,
seigniorage.  From equation (2),  we can get the upper  limit of primary  fiscal deficit to make
growth in the debt to  GDP ratio (db) non-positive, given projected real GDP growth rate (n),
inflation rate, velocity of money (v), which determine seigniorage and debt to  GDP ratio (b).
That is, government should keep primary fiscal deficit to  GDP ratio below  the upper  limit to
keep its debt on a converging path.
24.  Table 6 presents various scenarios and examines what might be the government's  fiscal
effort to  keep the  Ethiopian debt on  a  sustainable  path in  FY96  for  each  scenario.  Similar
analysis can be easily applied to future years with slight modifications. The base case (Scenario
1) takes the Government's program targets for FY96--real GDP growth rate of 6 percent  and
inflation rate of 4.5 percent. Also, we assume real LIBOR of 3.2 percent (nominal LIBOR of 5
percent and MUV of 1.8 percent); initial total debt to GDP ratio of  116 percent; and constant
velocity of money (i.e., money grows at the same rate as nominal GDP  grows). Under these
assumptions, if primary deficit is 4 percent of GDP, total debt to GDP ratio would decline by 2.4
percentage points in FY96. Thus, the upper limit of primary fiscal deficit would be 6.4 percent of
GDP to prevent the debt to GDP ratio from growing. In other words,  as long  as the primary
deficit is kept under 6.4 percent of GDP, Ethiopia's debt to GDP ratio won't increase.
25.  Scenarios 2 and 3 assume a real GDP growth of 0 percent (e.g., arising from a severe
drought). If the Government wants to contain inflation rate at 4.5 percent (Scenario 2) as in the
base case, while preventing its debt to GDP ratio from increasing, it would need to generate a
suplus  on  its primary  fiscal balance, amounting  to at least  2.4 percent  of GDP.  But,  if the
inflation target  is  15.7 percent  (Scenario 3),  same as  the average inflation rate  of  FY90-92,
containing primary fiscal deficit at less than 1.0 percent of GDP would be needed to prevent its
debt from  exploding. Thus,  neither scenario on  inflation rate with  zero percent  of  real GDP
growth,  and  sustainable  debt  path,  would  be  achieved  without  further  tightening  fiscal
management. Ethiopia's  debt situation may be shaky under recent fiscal management (primary
deficit of 4 to 5 percent of GDP) and vulnerability to external factors such as severe droughts.
11Table 5: Debt dynamics, FY1990-95
(percent  of GDP at market  price)
Real  Growth  factor  Growth of debt ratio
Period average  LIBOR  (r)  Growth  (n)  r-n  Debt/GDP  (b)  (r-n)*b  Inflation  Deficit  (p)  Seigniorage  (s)  p-s  db=(r-n)*b+(p-s)
FY1990-92  3.0%  -2.2%  5.2%  75.0%  3.9%  15.7%  8.5%  4.2%  4.3%  8.1%
FY1993-95  3.2%  6.4%  -3.2%  126.0%  -3.9%  7.2%  5.4%  4.0%  1.4%  -2.5%
Table 6: Debt dynamics under various scenarios, FY1996
(percent  of GDP at market  price)
Real  Growth factor  Growth  of debt ratio  Upper limit of deficit
LIBOR  (r)  Growth  (n)  r-n  Debt/GDP  (b)  (r-n)*b  Inflation  Deficit  (p)  Seigniorage  (s)  p-s  db=(r-n)*b+(p3s)  for non-positive  db
Base scenario, target
1.6% growth & 4.5% inflation  3.2%  6.0%  -2.8%  116.0%  -3.2%  4.5%  4.0%  3.1%  0.90/%  -2.4%  6A%
Severe drought (subtantial negative per-capita  GDP  growt
2. 0% growth & 4.5% inflation  3.2%  0.0%  3.2%  116.0%  3.7%  4.5%  4.0%  1.3%  2.7%  6.4%  -2.4%
3.0%  growth & 15.7% inflation  3.2%  0.0%  3.2%  116.00/o  3.7%  15.7%  4.0%  4.7%  -0.7%  3.0%/o  1.0%
Low growth (stagnant per-cpaita GDP  growth)
4.3%  growth & 4.5% inflation  3.2%  3.0%  0.2%  116.0%  0.2%  4.5%  4.0%  2.2%  1.8%  2.0%  2.0%
5.3% growth & 7.2% inflation  3.2%  3.0%  0.2%  116.0%  0.2%  7.2%  4.0%  3.0%  1.0%  1.2%  2.8%
6.3%  growth & 15.7% inflation  3.2%  3.0%  0.2%  116.0%  0.2%  15.7%  4.0%  5.6%  -1.6%  -1.4%  5.4%
Higher  real interest  rate
7. base case, but 5.2% real LIBOR  5.2%  6.0%  -0.8%  116.0%  -0.9%  4.5%  4.0%  3.1%  0.9%  -0.1%  4.1%26.  Scenarios 4, 5 and 6 assume a low growth of 3 percent with inflation rate at 4.5 percent
(long-term target),  7.2 percent  (average of FY93-95) and  15.7 percent  (average of FY90-92),
respectively. In these cases, primary deficit should be at most 2.0 percent, 2.8 percent and  5.4
percent of GDP, respectively. In other words, to keep Ethiopia's debt on sustainable path under a
low growth of 3 percent, it will be difficult for the Government to keep inflation rate below  10
percent under recent fiscal management (primary deficit of 4 to 5 percent of GDP).
27.  Scenario 7 assumes a very high real interest rate (LIBOR) of 5.2 percent instead of 3.2
percent while maintaining the other assumptions the same as the base case scenario. This change
reduces the upper limit of primary deficit from 6.4 percent to 4.1 percent of GDP. Thus, if real
LIBOR soars higher than 5.2 percent in FY96, tighter fiscal effort--primary deficit of less than 4
percent of GDP--will be required.
28.  All in all, although a good start has been made in putting Ethiopia's debt on a sustainable
path, more needs to be done. Since the Ethiopian economy depends so much on agriculture that
is  vulnerable  to  droughts  and  on  international market  conditions,  in  order  to  remain  on  a
sustainable  debt  path  needs  more  efforts--further  debt  relief,  improved  macroeconomic
management, and the policy environment for growth.
Conclusions
29.  This paper builds on the Branson model of debt sustainability and applies it to a severely
indebted  low  income  country,  Ethiopia.  It  provides  a  simplified  framework  where  debt
sustainability (both  domestic and external) is an integral element of macroeconomic stability.
Interactions between different policy variables (such as debt, fiscal and interest rate policies), and
outcome  variables  (such  as  GDP  and  export  growth),  as  well  as  international  economic
conditions (international interest rates) jointly define if the country is on a sustainable debt path.
Equations on debt sustainability can be easily estimated under this framework, and this could be
easily  estimated  for other  countries, and  in this  sense, it provides  a  good  starting point  for
examining debt sustainability.
30.  The lessons from the empirical analysis of Ethiopia are the following. First,  a  strong
reform program is critical for bringing the country back on a sustainable debt path. Second, the
issue  of  debt  relief  requires  serious  consideration  by  the  international  communities.  Third,
adequate emphasis would need to be continuosly placed on growth and resource mobilization to
ensure that debt is repaid. For most SILICs in Africa, this would require renewed emphasis on
making  agriculture  a  dynamic  sector  and  building  forward and  backward linkages  between
agriculture and  the rest  of the economy. In countries,  where famines  are recurrent,  dynamic
agricultural  growth  is  not  essential  only  for debt  sustainability, but  also  for achieving  food
security.
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